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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-v-

No. 16518

EUGENE ANDREINI,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the District Court of Carbon
County, State of Utah, with the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin,
Jr., Judge, presiding as a substitute for the Honorable Boyd
Bunnell, Judge, who disqualified himself.
The appellant was charged with aggravated assault,
a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.

§

76-5-

l03(b), and the appellant was convicted of simple assault, a
Class B Misdemeanor, in violation of Section 76-5-102, Utah
Code Annotated (1953), as amended.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant seeks to have his conviction reversed
or in the alternative remanded for a new trial after he has
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

had the right to take the depositions he was denied before the
trial from which this appeal is taken.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

On the lOth day of June, 1978, at the Savoy Club, a
bar in Price, Carbon County, Utah, there was a fight between
the appellant and James R. Priano.

(Tr. 148.)

The respondent contends that while Priano was talking
to another, the appellant struck Priano with a pool stick.
(Tr. 13. )
The appellant contends he struck Priano in selfdefense (Tr. 146) only after Priano had struck the first blow
by giving a backhand to the appellant's head which knocked off
his prescriptive glasses.

(Tr. 180.)

Other than the appellant and Priano, there were only
two eye witnesses who saw the fight begin.

Both of them testi-

fied that before the appellant had done anything physical
toward him, Priano struck the first blow in the same manner as
contended by the appellant.

(Tr. 150, 161, 162.)

In addition to wearing prescriptive glasses, the
appellant also suffered from a back injury he received when
13 years old by having been run over by a truck.

(Tr. 17 8.)

After being struck by Priano, the appellant went
down to the floor and came up with a pool stick from an area
where broken pool sticks were customarily kept.
The pool stick was in the appellant's left hand.

(Tr. 151.)
And the
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appellant is right handed.

Crr. 180.}

There was fighting, wrestling, and scuffling between
the appellant and Priano.

(Tr. 13, 17, 37, 38, 45, 76, 77,

78, 80, 148, 150, 158, 161, 162, 173, 180, 181, 184, 185.)
And others separated them.

(Tr. 15, 17, 64, 65, 70, 71, 76,

78, 79, 80, 81, 151, 162, 173.2
30 seconds.

(Tr. 17. 2

just like that, really.

All of it lasted only about

It was a very short time.

It was over

(Tr. 151.)

Even after the two had been separated, Priano walked
toward the appellant (Tr. 17, 45, 1812, gritting his teeth and
holding his arms like he was going toward the appellant again.
(Tr. 181.)

He turned and left the scene only after being

threatened by the appellant.

(Tr. 181.)

The above constitutes a general statement of the
appellant's version of the facts.

Other details will be cited

in support of the points of argument.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY DENYING
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO TAKE DEPOSITIONS
BEFORE TRIAL.
The appellant filed a motion to take depositions before the lower court with the purpose of obtaining additional
information from witnesses and using said information for its
impeachment value on cross-examination.

The lower court
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denied appellant's motion.
In the case of State v. Guerts, 11 Utah 2d 345, 359
P.2d 12 (1961), the Utah Supreme Court unanimously held in an
opinion written by then-Justice Crockett that it was error for
the accused to be denied the right to take depositions before
trial.

At page 16 he stated:
D. The most serious attack upon
the judgment is that the court
erred in rejecting defendant's request to take depositions of the
witnesses. , We willingly concede
that it is difficult to understand
••hy the district attorney opposed
the taking of depositions. He may
ha·,-e misconceived his duty. Notwithstanding the fact that under
our adversary system it is essential that he represent and safeguard
the interests of the State, it is
neither necessarv nor desirable that
a prosecutor conduct either a persecution or an inquisition. His
responsibility is to assist in an
inquiry into the facts to ascertain
the truth to the end that justice
be done. While we do not deem it
to be grounds for reversal here,
for reasons explained below, we are
not favorably impressed with the
failure to permit the taking of
depositions of the witnesses.
Four justices held such error not be be prejudicial

because the defendant in that case failed to claim that he
would have obtained any additional information from the depositions and because he had failed to assert the depositions'
value for purposes of cross-examination at trial.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR,-4may contain errors.

The fifth justice, then-Justice Henriod, dissented,
believing it was prejudicial error to deny the accused the
right or privilege of taking depositions, and stated:
The main opinion points out correctly that the accused had access
to information obtained by the
Grand Jury, (citations omitted)
and was furnished answers by the
district attorney to interrogations put to him. But it loses
sight of the fact that such information was not the product of
sworn testimony el~cited by questions aut bt counsel of the
accuse 's c o~ce. It seems to
lose sight also, of the fact that
. . . the right to take depositions frequently [is] the sharpest
weapon available to counsel in
piercing subsequent testimony by
confrontation with prior inconsistent testimony. Such an opportunity, denial of which appellant
assigned as error, quite frequently
results in impeachment that may
make the difference between guilt
or innocence in the minds of
veniremen. At 359 P.2d 18.
(Emphasis added.)
In concurrence with Justice Crockett's proposal of
proper prosecutorial procedure, it is submitted that the vestiges of sporting event surprise trials of the past should now
yield to the modern due process fairness model in search of
truth and justice.
Later, the Utah Supreme Court, in its opinion written
by then-Justice Tuckett in the case of State v. Nielsen,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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522 P.2d 1366 (Utah 1974), surprisingly ruled, without reference to its unanimous decision to the contrary in Guerts,
supra, that it was not error for an accused charged by complaint
to be denied the right to take depositions before trial, except
when a material witness for the defendant is about to leave the
state or is so ill or infirm as to afford reasonable grounds
for apprehension that he will be unable to attend the trial.
Then-Justice Ellett and Justice Crockett dissented in the
Nielsen case, with the controversy centering around Rule 8l(e)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (URCP).
That rule provides:
Application in criminal proceedings.
These rules of procedure shall also
govern ~n any aspect of criminal
proceedings when there is no other
applicable statute or rule, provided,
that any rule so applied does not
conflict with any statutory or constitutional requirement.
(Emphasis
added.)
In Nielsen the defendant argued, and the appellant in
the instant appeal now argues, that Rule 30 (URCP), which provides that "any party may take the testimony of any person
by deposition upon oral examination" is applicable through
Rule 8l(e) to criminal proceedings.
The majority in Nielsen, no longer sitting on the Utah
Supreme Court, found Rule 30 (URCP) to be in conflict with Utah
Code Ann.

§§

77-46-1 and 2.

Justice Crockett in his dissent
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persuasively pointed out that in fact no conflict exists as
§§

77-46-1 and 2 do not cover the taking of depositions.

Justice Crockett concluded:

Additionally, the majority in Nielsen was concerned
with the possibility that the prosecution would attempt to
take the deposition of a defendant and thus violate his right
against self-incrimination.

Again, Justice Crockett pointed

out that the majority's concern was not warranted:

"No one

supposes that any procedural rule could deprive a person of
his constitutional rights; and Rule 8l(e) clearly so indicates."
At p. 1369.

(Emphasis added.)

In sum, the appellant argues that this court should
adopt now-Chief Justice Crockett's dissenting opinion and
overrule the Nielsen case.
In Granato v. Salt Lake County Grand Jury, 557 P.2d
750 (Utah 1976), the majority never reached the issue of depositions being taken by the defendant.
dissent at p. 755:

In Justice Maughan's
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Plaintiff finally urges he should
be permitted to take depositions,
and that State ~. Nielsen, Utah,
522 P.2d 1366 (1974) should be
overruled. With this contention,
I am in complete agreement. A
defendant in a criminal action
should be permitted to take depositions;
He then writes Justice Henriod's dissent in Guerts
quoted above in appellant's brief.
The time is long past due to correct this inequality
of justice in Utah between the right of a defendant in a civil
case, the right of state in a criminal case and the denial of a
defendant in a criminal case to take depositions for the same
purposes.

If the right to take depositions is afforded a defen·

dant in civil cases, where he stands to lose only his dollars
and cents, surely that same right should be afforded a defendant
in a criminal case, where he stands to lose his life or liberty.
This court should reverse the lower court's order
denying the appellant's motion to take depositions and remand
this matter to the lower court with the order that the appellant
be granted the right to take depositions for discovery, crossexamination, impeachment, confrontation, or any other purpose
afforded a party in a civil case.
Such a ruling would be consistent with the mandates
of the due process and equal protection clauses of the United
States Constitution and Utah Constitution, and of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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confrontation of witnesses guarantee of Article I, Section 12
of the Utah Constitution.
This case on appeal particularly points out the
discriminatory denial of equal protection to the defense to
take depositions while allowing the prosecution that power,
which it exercised September 11, 1978, before preliminary hearing and trial. (Tr. 148, 156, 163, 168, 171.)
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-45-20, the State has
powers to depose witnesses in the investigation of crime, even
secretly, if necessary.

To deny the defense that right of

investigation technique for preparation of his defense is a
denial of equal protection.

There is no policy reason to jus-

tify perpetration of this inequality.

The accused is presumed

innocent until convicted, and he should be afforded the same
rights as the government in preparation of his case.
Even the new rules of criminal evidence provide for
both parties to take depositions.
POINT II
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY DENYING
APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION BY
PROPER CROSS-EXAMINATION.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "In all criminal prosecutions the accused
shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses
against him."

The Utah Constitution has a similar provision
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found in Article I, Section 12.
The United States Supreme Court has held the Sixth
Amendment's right of an accused to confront the witnesses
against him is a fundamental right binding upon the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause.

Pointer

v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S. Ct. 1065, 13 L. Ed. 2d 923 (1965}.
"The right of confrontation embraces the right of
cross-examination."

Chester J. Antieau, Modern Constitutional

Law, Sec. 5:74, Vol. One, 1969, The Lawyers Cooperative Publishing Company.
Wigmore, in his treatise on evidence, calls crossexamination "the greatest legal engine ever invented for the
discovery of truth."

V Wigmore on Evidence § 1367 (3rd ed.}.

It is submitted that for the above reasons careful,
strict scrutiny should be given to the restrictive rulings during appellant's cross-examination of the victim.

The rulings

prohibited examination designed to bring out the truth of the
event.

This limitation upon the fact-finding process is patent

error.

Broad scope should be afforded to the cross-examiner

to elicit the full facts of the occurrence.

This was denied

and an injustice resulted.
This court is invited to read the transcript with
strict scrutiny at pages 28, 29, 31, 32, 33, 34, 39, 40, 43,
44, 45, 46, 47, 49, 50, 71, 96, 127, 132, 133, 139, 140, 142,
143, 144, 145, 198, 199.)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-10-

As examples, the appellant was not permitted to
have Priano give his lay opinion relative to common matters
such as comparing types of scratches he received then and at
other times.

(Tr. 33, 34.2

The appellant was not permitted to show possibilities
relative to self-defense other than as testified to by Priano.
(Tr. 39.)
The appellant was not permitted to show through
Priano that other witnesses disagreed with him relative to who
struck the first blow.

(Tr. 40.)

The appellant was not permitted to show through
Priano that at no time did the appellant poke Priano in the
forehead with the pool stick.

(Tr. 43.)

The appellant was not permitted to show through
Priano that the event could have happened other than as Priano
testified on direct examination.

(Tr. 44.)

The appellant was not permitted to show through
Priano what was said and done between Priano and the appellant's
wife at a prior time at the Hollow Bottle relative to the
appellant's state of mind.
71, 144, 145.2

(Tr. 44, 45, 46, 49, 50, 67, 68,

It was not hearsay because it was not offered

for the truth of matter asserted.
the appellant's state of mind.

It was offered only to show

(Tr. 145.)

The appellant was not permitted to show through
Priano that his injuries could have been caused by means other
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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than the pool stick, such as wrestling, scuffling, and bumping
into other objects.

The appellant state there was evidence of

wrestling and scuffling.

The court ruled there had not been

such evidence (Tr. 127), when in fact there had been such evidence.

(Tr. 15, 17, 37, 38, 44, 64, 65, 66, 70, 71, 76, 77,

78, 79, 80, 81, 150, 151, 158, 161, 162, 173, 180, 181, 184,
185.)
The appellant was not permitted to show bias by close
relationship between witnesses relative to credibility.

(Tr.

198, 199.)
Although perhaps any one of these erroneous rulings
would not have amounted to prejudicial error, cumulatively they
reached that level and denied the appellant effective crossexamination to insure his right to confrontation.
In Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S. Ct. 1065,
13 L. Ed. 2d 923 (1965), it was held that the Sixth Amendment's
right of an accused to confront the witnesses against him was
a fundamental right, essential to a fair trial, and was made
obligatory on the states by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and that the confrontation clause of the
Sixth Amendment was thus enforceable against the states under
the Fourteenth Amendment according to the same standards which
protect the right to confrontation against federal encroachment
To the same effect are:

Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S.

415, 85 S. Ct. 1074, 13 L. Ed. 2d 934 (1965); Brookhart v.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 86 S. Ct. 1245,

16~.

Ed. 2d 3l4 (1966};

Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 87 S. Ct. 468, 17 L. Ed. 2d
420 (1966); Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 18 L. Ed. 2d
527 (1967); Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 88 S. Ct. 258,
19 L. Ed. 2d 319 (1967); Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129,
88 S. Ct. 748, 19 L. Ed. 2d 956 (1968); Barber v. Page, 390
U.S. 719, 88 S. Ct. 1318, 20 L. Ed. 2d 255 (1968); Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S. Ct. 1444 reh. denied 392 U.S.
947, 88 S. Ct. 2270, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1412 (1968); Berger v.
California, 393 U.S. 314, 89 S. Ct. 540, 21 L. Ed. 2d 508;
Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 89 S. Ct. 1420, 22 L. Ed. 2d 684;
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d
274 (1969); Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 89 S. Ct.
1726, 23 L. Ed. 2d 284 (1969).
A primary purpose of the confrontation clause is to
secure the right of cross-examination.

Pointer v. Texas, 380

U.S. 400, 85 S. Ct. 1065, 13 L. Ed. 2d 923 (1965); Douglas v.
Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 85 S. Ct. 1074, 13 L. Ed. 2d 934 (1965);
Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129, 88 S. Ct. 748, 19 L. Ed. 2d
956 (1968); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 88 S. Ct. 1318, 20
L. Ed. 2d 255 (1968).
The Supreme Court has established that under certain
circumstances the restriction of the scope of a defense attorney's cross-examination of a particular prosecution witness
may constitute a violation of an accused's constitutional
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right of confrontation.

Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129, 88

S. Ct. 748, 19 L. Ed. 2d 956 (1968).
In this case, the restricted cross-examination was
of the State's principal witness.

A thorough searching, sift-

ing of his recollection of the event, his credibility, his
motive, prejudices, and his inclinations were thwarted by the
cumulative effect of the trial court sustaining the State's
objections.

The cross-examination, as a reading of the tran-

script shows, was not by design argumentative but rather to
impeach the witness.

The right to impeach a witness by cross-

examination is universally recognized.

Am. Jur. Witnesses

§ 676.

CONCLUSION
The time is ripe for reversing the sporting event
surprise tactics of the Nielsen case, supra.
A criminal trial should be a search for the truth.
Defense depositions taken before trial can aid that endeavor
by preserving recitations of fact as in civil trials.

Allowing

defense depositions enhances the defendant's right to confrontation, preservation of testimony, and the impeachment of witnesses.
The inequities of this case wherein the government
takes depositions without the presence of the defense and the
defense is denied that opportunity patently discriminates
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without any worthy policy consideration.
And such restrictive cross-examination because of
the many erroneous evidentiary rulings amounts to a denial of
an adequate defense.
This court should reverse or remand with an order
allowing depositions and a new trial with guidelines for proper
evidentiary rulings.
DATED this

\ ~ day of March, 1980.
Respectfully submitted,
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~usee.

PHIL L. HANSEN
HANSEN AND HANSEN
250 East Broadway, Suite 100
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